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Then he got an idea. An awful idea. The Grinch got a wonderful, 
*awful* idea!1
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court recently decided United States v. Windsor,2 
which called into question the status of tax equality for family units. But 
even more unsettling is the fact that Windsor also called into question 
the status of the entire tax system. 
Since 1948, the U.S. tax system has provided for joint filing for 
married couples. This was a response to perceived unfairness in the tax 
system because a Supreme Court case granted different tax treatment to 
couples that lived in community property states.3 This change codified 
treatment of a married couple as an economic unit. 
Treatment of a married couple as an economic unit has profound 
implications for the tax system. Tax law allows favorable tax rates and 
ignores otherwise taxable transfers between partners in a marriage 
1. DR. SEUSS, HOW THE GRINCH STOLE CHRISTMAS (1957).
2. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (U.S. 2013). 
3. See Stephen T. Black, Same Sex Marriage and Taxes, 22 BYU J. PUB. L. 327, 332-33
(2008). 
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relationship. Arguments about some of the more troubling aspects of this 
arrangement were set aside because, for the most part, it worked. 
However, individuals now pushing for recognition as a same sex 
couple have claimed that they, too, should be entitled to be treated as an 
economic unit. This not only raises questions about whether any couple 
should be treated as an economic unit, but also, if so, which couples 
should be treated as such. 
For example, at one point prior to the adoption of joint filing, 
married couples tried to form business partnerships for the purpose of 
equalizing their income and reducing taxes. Courts fashioned ways to 
test whether a married couple was really a partnership for tax purposes. 
However, there are no reported cases of people wanting to form 
marriages for tax purposes (although there are many cases dealing with 
sham weddings for immigration purposes). 
This may be explained by the fact that marriage has always been 
surrounded with non-tax incidents and responsibilities—societal norms 
surround what it means to be married, to be a husband or wife, and to be 
divorced. In essence, the stigma of marriage and divorce precluded the 
use of marriage as a tax shelter, even though the tax benefits could be 
substantial. 
Consider the following example: 
Example 1. Harry and Wilma get married in June. Harry owns a 
building, which has increased in value. He transfers it to Wilma, and 
she gives him $2 million. There is no tax consequence to this 
exchange, even if the couple divorces in January.4 
To date, this type of marriage tax shelter has not been high on legal 
planners’ lists. Because of the costs attached to the marital relationship, 
the fact that the parties would have to be of opposite gender, and the 
difficulty surrounding termination of the relationship, many would not 
consider entering into a marriage for tax purposes alone. However, post-
Windsor, is this still the same? 
Example 2. Jill and Jane get married in November. Jill owns a 
building, which has increased in value. She transfers it to Jane, and 
Jane gives her $2 million. There is no tax consequence to this 
exchange, even if the couple divorces in January. 
It has long been an axiom that while state law determines what 
rights parties have, the federal tax impact (or benefits) flowing from 
those rights are solely a matter of federal law. In fact, one decision of the 
4. 26 U.S.C. § 1041 (2012).
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U.S. Supreme Court warned that this balance between federal and state 
laws must be treated with respect. “In looking to state law, we must be 
careful to consider the substance of the rights state law provides, not 
merely the labels the State gives these rights or the conclusions it draws 
from them. Such state law labels are irrelevant to the federal 
question . . . .”5 
In changing the concept of marriage in our society, has it become 
easier and more tempting for individuals to use “marriage” as a tax 
vehicle? That is, could a buyer and a seller of the $2 million building 
decide to forego the imposition of tax by getting married? 
This Article is concerned with the seemingly blind way the majority 
opinion in Windsor dealt with tax questions and the resulting train wreck 
of law. In its rush to answer some questions, the Court has apparently 
forgotten that a careful balance between federal and state law even 
exists. 
But why wring our hands? 
Whenever a court throws decades of legal principles out the 
window, several doors of legal planning opportunities are opened—in 
this case, opened wide! This Article examines how wide, and asks 
whether the tax planning opportunities post-Windsor threaten the 
stability of the tax system and the stability of marriage. Part II of this 
Article discusses the federal tax benefits married couples receive when 
treated as a single economic unit. In Part III, the Article examines the 
use of partnerships and marriages to attain tax benefits for the parties 
involved. Next, Part IV discusses the possibility of tax shelter 
opportunities through the use of multiparty marriages, which are now 
possible in light of the Windsor decision. Finally, Part V concludes. 
What has love got to do with it, after all? 
II. THE TAX BENEFITS OF MARRIAGE
The U.S. tax system allows a married couple to be treated as a 
single economic unit.6 For this reason, income can be shared between 
the couple,7 there are no recognized gains or losses on transfers between 
the couple,8 and the marital unit enjoys preferential rates on income.9 
5. U.S. v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 279 (2002).
6. 26 U.S.C. § 6013 (2012). See also Judith Treas, Money in the Bank: Transaction Costs
and the Economic Organization of Marriage, 58 AM. SOC. REV. 723, 723-34 (1993). 
7. 26 U.S.C. § 6013. See also James Alm & Leslie A. Whittington, The Rise and Fall and
Rise . . . of the Marriage Tax, 49 NAT’L TAX J. 571, 571-89 (1996); Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income 
Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1389, 1389-1463 (1975).  
8. 26 U.S.C. § 1041(a)(1).
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This would make marriage a ripe target for tax shelters and planning, if 
marriage did not come with so many other strings attached.10 
A. Single Economic Unit 
The law treats married couples as an economic unit.11 
No baseline of economic activity has been legislated by which to 
measure whether married individuals are functioning as an economic 
unit. The mere fact of marriage acts as a proxy, leading to the 
presumption that the married taxpayers are functioning as an economic 
unit. Once presumed, the tax code bestows certain benefits and 
imposes certain restrictions on the married taxpayers.12 
In the days prior to joint filing, couples tried to achieve this status 
through a variety of means,13 including contractual arrangements and 
forming partnerships.14 Many of these arrangements were an effort to 
avoid a marriage penalty: the higher tax that results when a couple’s 
income is taxed in only one partner’s hands. Splitting the income 
between two taxpayers allows the couple to take advantage of the second 
spouse’s lower rates and thus reduce the overall tax burden, even if only 
one spouse earns the income. 
Example 3. Before marriage, Husband’s $200,000 income placed him 
in the 33% bracket and generated a tax of $50,130.75. After his 
marriage, and due to the fact that he can now split his income via joint 
filing, the couple is in the 28% bracket and their tax liability drops to 
$43,465.50 . . . more than $6,000 lower. 
9. 26 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
10. Perhaps it is just these strings that have precluded tax planners to use marriage as a
planning device. See, e.g., Cara Buckley, Gay Couples, Choosing to Say “I Don’t,” N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 25, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/27/style/gay-couples-choosing-to-say-i-
dont.html?_r=0 (“marriage imposes financial burdens and legal entanglements. Still others see 
marriage not as a fairy tale but as a potentially painful chapter that ends in divorce.”); KAY 
HYMOWITZ ET AL., KNOT YET: THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF DELAYED MARRIAGE IN AMERICA 
(2013), available at http://nationalmarriageproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/KnotYet-
FinalForWeb.pdf; Lisa Selin Davis, All But the Ring: Why Some Couples Don’t Wed, TIME (May 
25, 2009), http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1898346,00.html. 
11. 26 U.S.C. § 6013.
12. Kelly A. Moore, The Curious Case of Dr. Jekyll and the Estate Tax Marital Deduction:
Should Prenuptial Agreements Alter the Relationship?, 33 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 255 (2013). See also 
Bridget J. Crawford, One Flesh, Two Taxpayers: A New Approach to Marriage and Wealth 
Transfer-Taxation, 6 FLA. TAX REV. 757, 768 (2004). 
13. Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 108-09 (1930); Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 113 (1930).
14. See infra Part III.B.
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B.  Transfers Between Spouses 
Although transfers between other parties, including those related to 
each other, may be taxable, transfers between spouses have not been. 
This concept can be traced to two early cases heard by the Board of Tax 
Appeals. 
In Burkhart v. Commissioner, the husband attempted to pay his 
wife for her duties as a housewife.15 In Appeal of Robinson, the wife 
attempted to pay her husband for giving up his seafaring life.16 In both 
cases, the court ignored the payments. In both cases, the court assumed 
that there could be no income realized by the transferee, and the 
Robinson court made this conclusion about the attempted transfer: 
“It is also argued that, in case the entire amount of the trust income is 
determined to be income to the taxpayer [wife], the part thereof going 
to the husband was under the contract a business expense to the 
taxpayer. We think it plain enough without discussion that this 
agreement between them was purely a family arrangement arising out 
of the marital relation, and that it was not entered into by the taxpayer 
for pecuniary profit.17 
Example 4. Husband and Wife maintain separate checking accounts, 
and each holds separate property (in either a community or non-
community property jurisdiction). Wife purports to “buy” land that 
Husband owns for $100,000, and she transfers the cash to him in 
exchange for a deed to the land. Husband does not recognize gain or 
loss, and Wife takes Husband’s basis in the land. 
C. Preferential Rates, Standard Deductions, and Earned Income 
Since the late 1940s, married couples have been able to file their 
tax returns using a joint status, combining their separate items of income 
and loss, and are entitled to a possible lower tax rate on their joint 
income. This, at times, gives rise to a marriage penalty or bonus, as the 
couple’s tax liability is compared to two corresponding individuals with 
the same income. 
Differences in income tax liabilities caused by marital status are 
embodied in a number of tax code provisions, beginning with separate 
rate schedules for married couples and single individuals. The most 
important other differences are those in the standard deduction and the 
15. Barkhart v. Comm’r, 11 B.T.A. 275 (1928).
16. Appeal of Robinson, 4 B.T.A. 504 (1926).
17. Id. at 506. See also Black, supra note 3, at 342-43 (citing Robinson).
6
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earned income tax credit (EITC). Those factors cause most two-earner 
couples in which husband and wife have roughly equal incomes to pay 
more tax than they would if they could file individual tax returns, 
incurring what has become known as a “marriage penalty.” At the 
same time, couples with just one earner or in which husband and wife 
have quite different incomes generally pay lower taxes as joint tax 
filers than they would if they could file as single taxpayers. Those 
couples receive what analysts have termed “marriage bonuses.”18 
III. SAME SEX MARRIAGE IN THE UNITED STATES
Currently, 35 states plus the District of Columbia allow same sex 
marriage,19 4 states have provisions for civil unions, and 8 states provide 
for domestic partnerships.20 However, the statutes are far from uniform. 
In fact, the rights, responsibilities, and benefits vary widely, and in 
coming years will see more changes as legal issues are ironed out. 
I have written previously21 that laws involving the creation and 
extension of benefits to couples in marital or quasi-marital relationships 
cannot depend on the intent of those parties to engage (or not to engage) 
in certain personal relationships—e.g., having children—and as a result, 
those laws have to settle for being generally applicable. If they are 
generally applicable, then it follows that anyone could form one of these 
unions, regardless of the motivation behind the decision. 
If so, then could we create unions that are taxable as marriages for 
federal (and state) purposes but that act like business entities? That is, 
could we strip the emotion and stigma from the relationship and view it 
as any other business partnership? 
18. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE: MARRIAGE AND THE
FEDERAL INCOME TAX xiii (1997), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/
cbofiles/ftpdocs/0xx/doc7/marriage.pdf; See also Tax Topics: Marriage Penalty, TAX POLICY CTR., 
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxtopics/Marriage-Penalties.cfm (last visited Apr. 19, 2015) (“Tax 
legislation since 2001 has substantially reduced marriage penalties and increased marriage bonuses 
by raising the standard deduction for couples to twice that for single filers and by setting the income 
range of 10 and 15 percent tax brackets for couples to twice that for individuals. Legislation also 
raised the starting point for the EITC phaseout range by $3,000 for married couples.”).   
19. Map, Same-sex Marriage in the United States, CNN (last updated Apr. 3, 2015, 12:51
PM), http://www.cnn.com/interactive/us/map-same-sex-marriage/. 
20. Nat’l Conference of State Legislators, Civil Unions and Domestic Partnership Statutes,
NCSL (last updated Nov. 18, 2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/civil-unions-and-
domestic-partnership-statutes.aspx. This includes legislation which provides broadly available 
benefits in the state, and is not limited to a particular group. For example, in some states certain 
benefits are provided to domestic partners who are state employees. 
21. Black, supra note 3, at 327-57.
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A, Partnerships and Marriage 
History teaches us that when tax rates get too high, taxpayers start 
to look for alternatives to paying high taxes. In 1946, when the nominal 
top tax bracket was 91%,22 some taxpayers considered forming 
partnerships with their spouses in an effort to take advantage of the other 
spouse’s lower tax bracket. 
Under current U.S. tax law, “a partnership is generally said to be 
created when persons join together their money, goods, labor, or skill for 
the purpose of carrying on a trade, profession, or business and when 
there is community of interest in the profits and losses.”23 The test is 
objective and does not rely upon the intent of the parties. 
B. Husband/Wife Partnerships 
“It is for this reason, among others, that we said in Helvering v. 
Clifford, that transactions between husband and wife calculated to 
reduce family taxes should always be subjected to special scrutiny.”24 
A partnership may be found to exist even when the parties do not 
believe one exists, since the determination is a question of law and not of 
objective belief.25 However, the mere fact that one of the parties owns or 
conducts a business does not necessarily establish a partnership unless 
there are other indicia of a partnership. Relevant factors include 
contribution by each partner to capital, an agreement to share profits and 
losses, and an agreement to share the assets and liabilities of a 
business.26 
In the marital or cohabitation context, the parties already have a 
relationship. To prove the existence of an additional partnership 
relationship in addition to the social relationship, there must be both an 
agreement and sufficient consideration.27 
22. IRS, INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 1040, U.S. INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURN 4 (1946),
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/i1040—1946.pdf. 
23. Mauldin v. Comm’r, 155 F.2d 666, 667-68 (4th Cir. 1946).
24. Comm’r v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280, 291 (1946). 
25. See Schilpp v. Schilpp, 380 So. 2d 573, 576 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (husband and wife
were partners in air conditioning business at time of divorce despite contention that failure to file 
partnership tax returns before breakup of marriage indicated there was no partnership). 
26. In re Ward, 6 B.R. 93, 95 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1980). See also FLA. STAT. ANN. §
620.8202(1) (West, Westlaw through 2015 1st Reg. Sess. of 24th Legis.). 
27. See Botsikas v. Yarmark, 172 So. 2d 277, 278-79 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (“Mutual
promises to live together in meretricious or illegal relationship not sufficient consideration to 
support agreement of partnership.”). See also Cannova v. Carran, 92 So. 2d 614, 620 (Fla. 1957) (en 
banc) (no joint enterprise in absence of agreement to enter undertaking in which parties have 
community of interest). 
8
Akron Law Review, Vol. 48 [2015], Iss. 3, Art. 4
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol48/iss3/4
2015] SAME SEX MARRIAGE TAX SHELTER 613 
There are no cases that require a husband and wife to be treated as a 
business partnership for tax benefits. Instead, there is a line of cases 
from the 1940s where the court scrutinized the relationship of husbands 
and wives claiming to be business partners and frequently held they 
could not file as a business partnership.28 
In one of the early cases, Lorenz v. Commissioner, the tax court 
noted that business partnerships between a husband and wife must be 
“scrutinized closely with a view to determine whether the partnership is 
bona fide.”29 To be recognized as a business partnership the court must 
see credible evidence of acts, facts, and circumstances to show the 
alleged spouse’s actual participation in the business.30 From the facts, 
the court determined they could not conclude that the business was a 
valid partnership, and the couple could not file as such for income tax 
purposes.31 
The Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Tower looked more closely 
at the requirements for a business partnership and found that a mere 
paper reallocation of income among family members was not a genuine 
business partnership.32 The Tower decision confirmed the standard of 
special scrutiny for transactions between husband and wife that would 
reduce family taxes.33 It reasoned that the outcome of a husband-wife 
partnership, though legal in the state, is that the income from the 
husband’s efforts continues to be used for the same purposes before the 
partnership, and “failure to tax it as the husband’s income would 
frustrate the purpose of 26 U.S.C. § 22(a) . . . .”34 Justice Hugo Black 
also noted in the opinion, “there can be no question that a wife and a 
husband may, under certain circumstances, become partners for tax, as 
for other, purposes.”35 However, she must invest capital, substantially 
contribute to the control and management, or perform vital additional 
28. See Lorenz v. Comm’r., 148 F.2d 527 (6th Cir. 1945); Tower, 327 U.S. at 291; Lusthaus
v. Comm’r, 327 U.S. 293, 297 (1946); Maudlin v. Comm’r., 155 F.2d 666, 668 (4th Cir. 1946);
Hougland v. Comm’r, 166 F.2d 815, 816 (6th Cir. 1948).  
29. Lorenz v. Comm’r, 3 T.C. 746, 751 (1944), aff’d , 148 F.2d at 528. But see Katherine D.
Black, Stephen T. Black & Michael D. Black, When a Discount Isn’t a Bargain: Debunking the 
Myths Behind Family Limited Partnerships, 32 U. MEM. L. REV. 245, 276-77 (2002) (discussing the 
Tax Court’s apparent reliance on formalities alone in the decision of Estate of Strangi v. Comm’r, 
115 T.C. 478 (2000)).  
30. Lorenz, 3 T.C. at 751.
31. Id. at 754.
32. Tower, 327 U.S. at 292.
33. Id. at 291.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 290.
9
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services, as set out by 26 U.S.C.A. (I.R.C. 1954) §§ 1, 61, 701, 702.36 
Following the reasoning laid out in the Tower decision, in 1948 the 
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decided the husband was correct to file 
all the income from a “partnership agreement” between his mother and 
his wife.37 Although he had transferred interests to his wife and his 
mother, there was no change in the management or control, and neither 
contributed any vital services.38 
The Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Culbertson was forced to 
look deeper at the issue and determine “whether an intention to 
contribute capital or services sometime in the future is sufficient to 
satisfy ordinary concepts of partnership, as required by the Tower 
case.”39 The Court explained that its Tower decision emphasizes the 
importance of participation in the business partnership during that 
specific tax year.40 In addition, it stated the final test is not “vital 
services” or “original capital,” but is “whether the partnership is real 
within the meaning of the federal revenue laws.”41 Finally, the Court 
noted although many decisions had come down that found no business 
partnership existed, there is not a virtual ban on partnerships composed 
of the members of an intimate family group.42 
However, by the end of the 1940s it was clear that courts were very 
strict when determining whether a wife was in a legitimate business 
partnership with her husband. The Supreme Court even noted the 
temptation that married couples faced to file as a business partnership 
for the sake of tax savings.43 
C. Comparison of Marriage Taxation and Partnership Taxation 
What’s the big deal? If husband and wife are married and 
conducting a business together, won’t their income all be taxed the same 
anyway? 
Not necessarily. 
Because of the way our tax system works—including the 
progressive rate structure, the separate capital gains system, and other 
provisions including the alternative minimum tax—it is entirely possible 
36. Id.
37. Hougland v. Comm’r, 166 F.2d 815, 816 (6th Cir. 1948).
38. Id.
39. Comm’r v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 738-39 (1949).
40. Id. at 740
41. Id. at 741.
42. Id. at 753.
43. Id. at 754.
10
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for there to be differences in tax liability depending on whether the 
couple chooses to report their income via a joint return or a partnership 
return.44 The following are some examples. 
1. Contributions
a. Gains
Let us assume that A and B are married and have started a business. 
A has $100 cash to contribute, and B has property worth $100 that she 






Cash 100 100 A 100 100 
Property 50 100 B 50 100 
This reflects the proper allocation of bases and the understanding 
that A and B now own partnership interests while the AB partnership 
44. One commentator has written:
The income tax law largely follows the partnership model of marriage in its treatment of 
spouses during the marriage and upon its termination. Husbands and wives may file a 
joint income tax return which allows them to combine their incomes and deductions for 
tax purposes. The joint return presumes that married couples share or pool their incomes; 
otherwise there is no logical justification for this pooling. Tax consequences at divorce 
are roughly analogous to those that occur when a partnership breaks up. There are two 
types of distributions in connection with a divorce: property divisions and alimony. 
Spouses recognize no gain or loss on the division of property at the time of termination 
of the marriage and their basis in the property is the basis the marital partnership had. 
The analogy does not work smoothly, however, because spouses (unlike partners) have 
no tax bases in their partnership interests that is independent of the partnership’s basis in 
the property it holds. In partnership law, a partner’s basis in the partnership places limits 
both on how much money she can receive from the partnership tax free and on the basis 
she will have in any partnership property distributed to her. These limits do not exist for 
a property division that occurs incident to a breakup of a marriage. Most alimony, on the 
other hand, is analogous to a guaranteed payment or a distributive share made in 
liquidation of a partner’s interest. Even a two-member partnership is not considered 
terminated until the departing partner’s entire interest is liquidated. Consequently, an 
alimony payment would be ordinary income to the partner (payee spouse) and deductible 
to the partnership (and hence the payor spouse). There is no dependency deduction for a 
spouse since each spouse is considered an equal; instead each spouse is entitled to a 
personal exemption. 
Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Theory Versus Reality: The Partnership Model of Marriage in Family and 
Income Tax Law, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1413, 1431-33 (1996). 
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now owns the assets they contributed.45 
Further, let us assume that shortly after formation, the partnership 
decides to sell the property for $110. We are told by the government that 
B should take the pre-contribution gain of $50, and that A and B should 
each share the post-contribution gain of $10, for $5 each.46 
Is that the same if A and B did not form a partnership? No. 
In the non-partnership scenario, we must ask whether the property 
was held as separate property by B, or if it was transmuted into marital 
or community property. If separate property, then the gain of $60 would 
belong solely to B; if marital/community property, the gain would be 
shared at $30 each. 
Very exciting—but does it matter? Maybe. If A and B choose to 
file a joint return, then no, it does not matter. But if they choose to file 
separately,47 then how the gains are allocated between them may matter. 
b. Losses
What happens if the property was sold for $40? 
In the case of a partnership, there are two losses to contend with. 
The book loss, or the $60 drop from the parties’ expectation that the 
property was worth $100, is allocated evenly.48 The tax loss, or the $10 
drop from what B paid ($50), is also allocated evenly. This produces a 





Cash 140 140 A 95 70 
B 45 70 
This allows B to share her tax loss today and creates the potential 
for shifting a bigger loss to A in the future at the expense of a gain to B 
in the future. 
In the non-partnership scenario, we again must ask how the 
property was held. If it was separate, the $10 tax loss is B’s, while if it 
was marital property, the $10 tax loss is shared. Note, however, that in 
the marriage context, there is no future shifting of gains and losses. 
45. 26 U.S.C. §§ 721- 723 (2012).
46. 26 U.S.C. § 704(c) (2012).
47. 26 U.S.C. § 6013(a) (2012) (stating that “[a] husband and wife may make a single
return”). 
48. That is, assuming that A & B agreed to share losses evenly.
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c. The Lesson?
Contributions behave as expected. We are leery of partnerships 
being used as a device to shift gains or losses from one partner to 
another, therefore 26 U.S.C. § 704(c) allocates the pre-contribution gain 
of $50 to the partner who contributed the property. 
With the loss example, partnerships are viewed in two ways. First, 
one might question whether the property was in fact worth $100 if it was 
ultimately sold for $40 after contribution.49 Second, there is a tendency 
to view partnerships as comprised of independent adults who look after 
their own interests, and therefore, if the partnership incurs a loss, how 
the parties choose to split it is fine, as long as the economics of the 
matter mirror the tax consequences.50 
In the marriage context, however, it is assumed that marriage 
partners have committed their assets to a community and want to share 
all income and losses equally. It therefore does not make any sense to 
carry forward future gains and losses since the couple has agreed to pool 
all the income anyway. 
2. Characterization
Things get a bit more interesting when dealing with the 
characterization of the gains and losses. Assume that A from the 
previous example is a physician, and his wife, B, is a securities broker. If 
the securities contributed by B would have been inventory when held by 
her, does it become a capital asset when held by the partnership (or the 
marital union)? 
Congress was worried about such attempts to change the character 
of property contributed to a partnership when it enacted 26 U.S.C. § 724. 
Congress was concerned that, under certain circumstances, a taxpayer 
could alter the character of gain or loss merely by contributing 
property to a new or existing partnership. In particular, the conversion 
of capital to ordinary losses by contributing securities to a dealer 
partnership allowed a taxpayer to receive the benefits of capital gain 
taxation on appreciated securities (by selling them individually) while 
49. See Sammons v. United States, 433 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1970) (taxpayer was deemed to
receive a constructive dividend when a paper bag business was sold for below market value from a 
corporation wholly owned by the taxpayer to another corporation indirectly controlled by the 
taxpayer). 
50. And thus the future gain/loss split is appropriate, since A was anticipating the property
being worth $100; and so we give him a future loss and B a future gain to account for the $50 pre-
contribution gain that was never realized. 
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deducting ordinary losses on the sale of securities which had declined 
in value (by having the dealer partnership sell them and allocate the 
resulting loss to the taxpayer). Congress believed that these potential 
abuses should be prevented by preserving the pre-contribution 
character of contributed (or substituted basis) property in appropriate 
cases.51 
So, for example, if B contributes securities worth $100 for which 
she paid $50 to the AB partnership, is the resulting $50 gain ordinary (as 
it would be if she sold them) or capital (as it would be if the partnership 
or A sold them)? 
Section 724 indicates that for the next five years, the AB 
partnership will have to treat the gain as ordinary, since the securities are 
“tainted” with B’s characterization. 
However, there is a real issue when deciding whether items of 
income should be reported by looking at the partnership as an entity or 
as a group of individuals.52 
But what about the AB marriage? 
Cases are legion that state the following principal: “whether 
property sold by taxpayer at profit was property held by taxpayer 
primarily for sale to customers in course of his trade or business, within 
meaning of statute, is essentially a question of fact and, necessarily, each 
case turns upon its own particular facts.”53 But when B transfers the 
property into A’s hands and A sells the securities, A is not a dealer. The 
securities are not inventory to him, and therefore, he argues that he is 
entitled to report the gain as capital. 
Now, to be sure, if this process is repeated over and over, it would 
be correct to determine that the securities have become “property held 
by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of 
his trade or business”54 and to tax the gain as ordinary. But what if the 
sales made by A are infrequent? What if they are not regular? 
Could the couple use a quick, “Vegas-style” marriage to 
accomplish through the marriage laws what Congress sought to avoid 
through the use of a partnership? After all, the incentives are tantalizing. 
Ordinary income is taxed at a maximum rate of 39.6%, while long term 
51. Staff of J. Comm. on Taxation, 98th Cong., Gen. Explanation of the Revenue Provisions
of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, 234-35 (Comm. Print 1984). 
52. See Mary Louise Fellows, Partnership Taxation: Confusion in Section 702(b), 32 TAX L.
REV.  67 (1976). 
53. See, e.g., Bauschard v. Comm’r, 279 F.2d 115 (6th Cir. 1960); United States v. Winthrop,
417 F.2d 905 (5th Cir. 1969); Scheuber v. Comm’r, 371 F.2d 996 (7th Cir 1967). 
54. 26 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(1)(B) (2012).
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capital gains are taxed at a maximum of 15%.55 On a sale resulting in a 
gain of $1 million, that’s a tax savings of over $200,000. 
3. Contributions of Encumbered Property
In a partnership context, the partners are also treated as separate 
when one partner tries to contribute property that is subject to a loan. 
The reason for this is that the partnership, now treated as a separate 
entity, will be paying off the loan, which results in an improved financial 
position for the contributing partner, but which, except for this rule, 
would not be subject to tax. Thus, to the extent the loan is greater than 
the contributor’s basis, the contributor recognizes gain. 
Assume that B’s property is still worth $100, and B paid $50 for it 
but has taken out a loan of $60. Upon contribution, B should recognize 
$10 of gain. 
In the marriage, 26 U.S.C. § 1041 again simplifies matters. Unless 
this is a transfer in trust,56 we simply do not care—tax-wise. Note that in 
a partnership context, this can skew the reporting of income, since B 
could have received the loan proceeds, tax-free, and then transferred the 
property to the partnership, which would then pay off the loan. 
4. § 1031 Exchanges 
Section 1031 allows a taxpayer to postpone payment of taxes on the 
sale of property by “[reinvesting] the proceeds in similar property as part 
of a qualifying like-kind exchange.”57 This section only applies to 
investment and business property, and so a taxpayer cannot swap his or 
her primary residence for another home, but can swap a rental property 
(i.e., investment property) for other rental or investment property. 
Section 1031 stipulates that the properties must be of “like-kind” in 
order to qualify, and “like-kind” is a term of art. “Most real estate will be 
like-kind to other real estate. For example, real property that is improved 
with a residential rental house is like-kind to vacant land.”58 On the other 
hand, real and personal property are never like kind to the other, and the 
rules for like-kind personal property are more restrictive (i.e., cars and 
trucks are not like-kind).59 
55. 26 U.S.C. § 1(h) (2012)
56. 26 U.S.C. §1041(e) (2012).
57. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, FS-2008-18, LIKE-KIND
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Furthermore, the IRS realizes that a direct exchange of one property 
for another is difficult; for this reason delayed exchanges or exchanges 
involving multiple parties and properties can take place. For example, 
Adam wants to sell an apartment building that has appreciated in value, 
and Bob offers to purchase it for cash. Adam would like to continue to 
hold some type of commercial property and wants to structure the 
transaction as a like-kind exchange. However, the chance of finding 
suitable commercial property whose owner is willing to trade for 
Adam’s property is remote. 
Adam could structure a three-party exchange, consisting of Adam 
(seller), Bob (buyer), and Carl (the seller of replacement commercial 
property suitable to Adam). Bob purchases Carl’s property and then 
exchanges it for Adam’s property, and Adam has deferred the tax on the 
exchange of his property. 
In an exchange, receipt of cash by the taxpayer for his relinquished 
property would forfeit the availability of 26 U.S.C. § 1031, and thus a 
third party is frequently necessary. For example, a taxpayer sells his 
property, and the cash is then held by an intermediary. When suitable 
replacement property is found, the intermediary subsequently uses the 
cash to buy the new property. 
Section 1031 exchanges are complicated. There are timing and 
other restrictions that can cause the transaction to become taxable. 
However, a tax-free exchange pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §1041 is not subject 
to the same rules. Thus, A and B are contemplating a like-kind exchange 
but would fail to meet one of the requirements (e.g., the exchange would 
take too long, the properties are not like-kind, or the properties are not of 
similar value, and thus boot is required). A § 1031 exchange would fail. 
However, if A and B enter into a same sex union, § 1041 would 
cover the transaction, and A could walk away with B’s property and no 
gain, B could walk away with A’s property and no gain, and §1031 has 
just been undone. 
D. Other Issues 
There are other issues that would be taxed differently in a marriage 
and a partnership, but they fall outside the scope of this article.60 
60. For example, treatment and allocation of debt (26 U.S.C. § 752), allocations of
income/loss, allocations of depreciation, contributions of services/income only interests, 26 U.S.C. § 
83 issues, loss limitations, the gain and treatment of partners and the partnership upon admission of 
new partners, tax treatment of terminations, and the treatment of non-US citizen partners, to name a 
few. 
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E. Judicial Doctrines 
The government has long taken the position that some transactions, 
which technically fall within the law, are nonetheless impermissible 
because they reach a result that Congress did not intend.  
As a result, the IRS and the courts have crafted judicial doctrines to 
combat these types of transactions. While presented as separate 
doctrines, there is sufficient confusion and overlap in their application to 
treat them together. 
1. Sham Transactions
Sham transactions involve the argument that the taxpayer has used 
form over substance to perpetrate a tax fraud.61 One of the earliest cases 
is that of Gregory v. Helvering.62 
Petitioner in 1928 was the owner of all the stock of United Mortgage 
Corporation. That corporation held among its assets 1,000 shares of the 
Monitor Securities Corporation. For the sole purpose of procuring a 
transfer of these shares to herself in order to sell them for her 
individual profit, and, at the same time, diminish the amount of income 
tax which would result from a direct transfer by way of dividend, she 
sought to bring about a ‘reorganization’ under section 112(g) of the 
Revenue Act of 1928. . . . To that end, she caused the Averill 
Corporation to be organized under the laws of Delaware on September 
18, 1928. Three days later, the United Mortgage Corporation 
transferred to the Averill Corporation the 1,000 shares of Monitor 
stock, for which all the shares of the Averill Corporation were issued 
to the petitioner. On September 24, the Averill Corporation was 
dissolved, and liquidated by distributing all its assets, namely, the 
Monitor shares, to the petitioner. No other business was ever 
transacted, or intended to be transacted, by that company. Petitioner 
immediately sold the Monitor shares for $133,333.33. She returned for 
taxation, as capital net gain, the sum of $76,007.88, based upon an 
apportioned cost of $57,325.45. Further details are unnecessary. It is 
not disputed that if the interposition of the so-called reorganization was 
ineffective, petitioner became liable for a much larger tax as a result of 
the transaction.63 
The Court, in agreeing with the IRS, held: 
The whole undertaking, though conducted according to the terms of 
61. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935); Knetch v. U.S. 364 U.S. 361 (1960).
62. Gregory, 293 U.S. at 465.
63. Id. at 467.
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subdivision (B), was in fact an elaborate and devious form of 
conveyance masquerading as a corporate reorganization, and nothing 
else. The rule which excludes from consideration the motive of tax 
avoidance is not pertinent to the situation, because the transaction upon 
its face lies outside the plain intent of the statute. To hold otherwise 
would be to exalt artifice above reality and to deprive the statutory 
provision in question of all serious purpose.”64 
Many authors have dealt with the advisability of a test designed to 
detect artifice and shams, and how those tests weaken or enhance the tax 
system.65 In truth, what Mrs. Gregory was attempting to do involved a 
business transaction which the government thought the taxpayer planned 
for tax purposes. One of the least well kept secrets in business today is 
that taxpayers do exactly that—plan business transactions to take 
advantage of tax rules. Taxpayers frequently disguise the transaction in 
business clothing, citing non-tax reasons so as to avoid the imposition of 
the form-over-substance argument. 
However, when the artifice is not a business relationship, but a 
marriage, do the same rules apply? Can one claim that a marriage 
entered into for tax benefits (or any other benefits, for that matter) is not 
as real as one entered into for non-tax reasons? 
What are the reasons for a valid marriage anyway? 
Is a marriage of short duration still valid if, after “eloping” to Las 
Vegas, the couple realizes the folly of their ways on Monday morning? 
And will it be federal law that determines whether the marriage is a 
sham? If so, the sham transaction doctrine has just been seriously 
curtailed by the Supreme Court in Windsor.66 
2. Step Transaction Doctrine
The step transaction doctrine is in effect another rule of substance over 
form; it treats a series of formally separate ‘steps’ as a single 
64. Id. at 470.
65. See, e.g., Richard Gordon & Andrew P. Morriss, Moving Money: International Financial
Flows, Taxes, and Money Laundering, 37 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1 (2004); Richard J. 
Kovach, Taxes, Loopholes and Morals Revisited: A 1963 Perspective on the Tax Gap, 30 WHITTIER 
L. REV. 247 (2008). 
66. “DOMA’s unusual deviation from the usual tradition of recognizing and accepting state
definitions of marriage here operates to deprive same-sex couples of the benefits and responsibilities 
that come with the federal recognition of their marriages. This is strong evidence of a law having 
the purpose and effect of disapproval of that class. The avowed purpose and practical effect of the 
law here in question are to impose a disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma upon all who 
enter into same-sex marriages made lawful by the unquestioned authority of the States.” United 
States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013).   
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transaction if such steps are in substance integrated, interdependent, 
and focused toward a particular result. There is no universally accepted 
test as to when and how the step transaction doctrine should be applied 
to a given set of facts.67 
If a marriage produces tax savings for a couple, but then ends in 
divorce, could a court use the step transaction doctrine to undo the 
transaction? 
“The end result test is based upon the actual intent of the parties as 
of the time of the merger. It can be argued that any test which requires a 
court to make a factual determination as to a party’s intent promotes 
uncertainty and therefore impedes effective tax planning.”68 
F. Sham Weddings 
1. Immigration and False Marriages
Marriage fraud has been prosecuted, inter alia, under 8 U.S.C. § 1325 
and 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a). The Immigration Marriage Fraud 
Amendments Act of 1986 amended § 1325 by adding § 1325(c), which 
provides a penalty of five years imprisonment and a $250,000 fine for 
any “individual who knowingly enters into a marriage for the purpose 
of evading any provision of the immigration laws.” Under 8 U.S.C. § 
1151(b), “immediate relatives” of U.S. citizens, including spouses, 
who are otherwise qualified for admission as immigrants, must be 
admitted as such, without regard to other, ordinary numerical 
limitations. The typical fact pattern in marriage fraud cases is that a 
U.S. citizen and an alien get married. They fulfill all state law 
requirements such as medical tests, licensing, and a ceremony. But the 
U.S. citizen is paid to marry the alien in order to entitle the alien to 
obtain status as a permanent resident of the United States; the parties 
do not intend to live together as man and wife. A legal issue arises 
where the parties tell the INS they are married, and they subjectively 
believe they are telling the truth because they have complied with state 
marriage requirements. The Supreme Court has ruled that the validity 
of their marriage under state law is immaterial to the issue of whether 
they defrauded INS. 
There have been situations where a bona fide marriage turns sour but 
the alien induces the U.S. citizen spouse to maintain the marriage as a 
ruse only as long as necessary for the alien to obtain status as a 
permanent resident alien. There is a line of cases holding that the 
67. Penrod v. Comm’r, 88 T.C. 1415, 1428-29 (1987) (citations omitted).
68. Id. at 1430.
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viability of the marriage, if initially valid, is not a proper concern of 
the INS. United States v. Qaisi, 779 F.2d 346 (6th Cir. 1985); 
Dabaghian v. Civilleti, 607 F.2d 868 (9th Cir. 1979), and cases cited 
therein. However, the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 
1986, 8 U.S.C. § 1186a, were designed, inter alia, to eliminate the 
Qaisi type loophole by establishing a two-year conditional status for 
alien spouses seeking permanent resident status, and requiring that an 
actual family unit still remain in existence at the end of the two year 
period.69 
There is no such federal statute for tax purposes. In fact, if Justice 
Anthony Kennedy is to be believed, any such federal statute would be of 
questionable constitutional validity. “The avowed purpose and practical 
effect of the law here in question are to impose a disadvantage, a 
separate status, and so a stigma upon all who enter into same sex 
marriages made lawful by the unquestioned authority of the States.”70 
IV. MULTIPARTY MARRIAGES AND TAX SHELTER
OPPORTUNITIES 
With all the opportunities that marital tax planning may provide 
post-DOMA (Defense of Marriage Act), the question could reasonably 
be asked: Are we limited to just two parties to a marriage?71 
The answer is “no.” 
Justice Antonin Scalia’s dissent in the Windsor decision only 
scratched the surface.72 Because of the differences in state laws allowing 
69. U.S. ATTORNEYS, CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL: MARRIAGE FRAUD – 8 U.S.C. §
1325(C) AND 18 U.S.C. § 1546, at § 1948, available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/
foia_reading_room/usam/title9/crm01948.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2015) (citing Lutwak v. United 
States, 344 U.S. 604 (1953) (followed in United States v. Yum, 776 F.2d 490 (4th Cir. 1985); Johl 
v. United States, 370 F.2d 174 (9th Cir. 1966); Chin Bick Wah v. United States, 245 F.2d 274 (9th
Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 870 (1957)); but see United States v. Lozano, 511 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 
1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 850 (1975); United States v. Diogo, 320 F.2d 898 (2d Cir. 1963); but 
cf., United States v. Sarantos, 455 F.2d 877 (2d Cir. 1972)). 
70. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693.
71. Samuel D. Brunson, Taxing Polygamy, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 113, 127 (2013).,
72. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2708 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing William Baude, Beyond
DOMA: Choice of State Law in Federal Statutes, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1371 (2012); Godfrey v. Spano, 
920 N.E.2d 328 (N.Y. 2009)):  
To choose just one of these defenders’ arguments, DOMA avoids difficult choice-of-law 
issues that will now arise absent a uniform federal definition of marriage. Imagine a pair 
of women who marry in Albany and then move to Alabama, which does not “recognize 
as valid any marriage of parties of the same sex.” Ala.Code § 30–1–19(e) (2011). When 
the couple files their next federal tax return, may it be a joint one? Which State’s law 
controls, for federal-law purposes: their State of celebration (which recognizes the 
marriage) or their State of domicile (which does not)? (Does the answer depend on 
20
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same sex unions, marriages, and partnerships, it is possible for a couple 
to enter into a new same sex union even if one or both of the parties are 
already in a marriage (same sex or otherwise). 
Let us see how some of these might be constructed. 
A. Disregarded Marriages 
A disregarded marriage happens when one jurisdiction does not 
recognize the union created by another jurisdiction. This allows a couple 
in the second jurisdiction to create a union (the “second union”) between 
one of the couple in the first union and a third party. For example, if A 
and B are married in one state, but that marriage is not recognized in 
Texas, Texas could issue a marriage license for A to marry C in Texas. 
Disregarded marriages create difficult questions of both state and 
federal law involving tax and property issues. 
1. North Dakota
Recently, the North Dakota Attorney General, Wayne Stenehjem, 
issued a letter opinion regarding a man who had entered into a same sex 
marriage in a state that allows such relationships. The man asked about 
the possibility of obtaining a marriage license to marry a woman in 
North Dakota, which does not recognize same sex marriages.73 
It is my opinion because explicitly prohibited by state constitution and 
statutes, an individual’s previously valid same-sex marriage in another 
state is not legally recognized in North Dakota and he or she may be 
issued a valid marriage license here. Further, it is my opinion that since 
the North Dakota Constitution prohibits the recognition of such a 
union, the individual would not be committing a criminal violation in 
this state by indicating he or she was “Single/Never Married” on a 
signed marriage application.74 
Example 5. 
whether they were just visiting in Albany?) Are these questions to be answered as a 
matter of federal common law, or perhaps by borrowing a State’s choice-of-law rules? If 
so, which State’s? And what about States where the status of an out-of-state same-sex 
marriage is an unsettled question under local law? 
73. Eric M. Johnson, North Dakota Says Man in Same-Sex Marriage May Wed Woman Too,
REUTERS (Dec. 18, 2013, 7:04 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/19/us-usa-northdakota-
marriage-idUSBRE9BH1I520131219. 
74. Letter Opinion (2013-L-06) from Wayne Stenehjem, Attorney Gen., to Richard J. Riha,
State’s Attorney, Burleigh Cnty. (Dec. 12, 2013), available at http://www.ag.nd.gov/
Opinions/2013/Letter/2013-L-06.pdf. 
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1. J and K, both of the same gender, get married in IL.
2. L and M, also of the same gender, get married in IL.
3. Afterward, K and L travel to ND for the weekend, and they get
married. 
The J+K ~ L+M group is now treated under the law how? What if J 
and M also travel to ND and get married? 
For ND purposes, J+M and K+L are married. For IL purposes, J+K 
and L+M are married. 
For federal purposes, the result is more complicated. In 2013, the 
IRS issued a ruling stating that for federal tax purposes, a same sex 
couple is “married” if the individuals are lawfully married under state 
law; that generally, a marriage of same sex individuals that was validly 
entered into is valid for federal law even if the married couple is 
domiciled in a state that does not recognize the validity of same sex 
marriages; and that registered domestic partnerships, civil unions, or 
other similar relationships which are not called “marriages” under the 
laws of that state are not marriages for federal tax purposes.75 
This means that, arguably, all the marriages from the above 
example could receive federal recognition (which our system is not 
designed to address) or, if the issue were litigated, could create issues of 
first impression for many courts and legislatures. 
What if the four of them move to a community property state? Does 
their property, or in the case of California, their income, get shared?76 
If so, how does this differ from a JKLM partnership (taxed under 
subchapter K77)? Marriages are not subject to partnership anti-abuse 
rules and do get the benefits of 26 U.S.C. § 1041 (which allows 
“spouses” to transfer, tax-free, property between themselves). Marriages 
may elect to file jointly (except that current § 1040 only imagines 
marriages with two spouses), and while spouses are allowed to file 
separately, they are not generally subjected to the special rules of 26 
U.S.C. § 704 (which governs allocations of income and loss between 
partners). There are other issues,78 both on the federal and state level, but 
one can begin to see that there may be an advantage, tax-wise, to being 
able to have a second (or more!) spouse. 
75. Rev. Rul. 2013-17, 2013-38 I.R.B. 201.
76. See Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 118 (1930).
77. 26 U.S.C. §§ 701-777 (2012).
78. See Brunson, supra note 71, at 133-35.
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2. Delaware
Delaware law defines a “civil union” to be a legal union under 
Delaware law.79 Parties may enter into a Delaware civil union only if 
they are not in a marriage, a Delaware civil union, or a “substantially 
similar legal relationship.”80 What is substantially similar is not defined. 
Does this mean that parties to another state’s civil union could enter 
into a second civil union in Delaware, because Delaware does not 
recognize the first? 
B. Converted Unions 
Currently, IRS Revenue Ruling 2013-17 applies only to same sex 
marriages.81 Whether Congress or the IRS will recognize other types of 
unions is an open question, but is there any way to convert a civil union 
to marriage? 
1. Washington
Thirty four states do not provide for same sex marriage. 
Washington, however, not only recognizes out-of-state unions as 
registered domestic partnerships, but it converts them to Washington 
marriages. How will the IRS treat these? 
With a 2009 expansion of the law (Chapter 26.60 RCW) originally 
passed in 2007, registered domestic partners were afforded nearly all 
statewide spousal rights.82 However, this expansion was challenged by a 
ballot measure to repeal the additional benefits, Referendum 71, which 
passed in November 2009. Washington’s domestic partner law remains 
unchanged and provides a full scope of domestic partner benefits.83 
Referendum 74 was passed in the November 2012 general election 
legalizing same sex marriage. 
However, Washington recognizes out-of-state civil unions and 
domestic partnerships. 
A legal union, other than a marriage, of two persons that was validly 
formed in another jurisdiction, and that is substantially equivalent to a 
domestic partnership under this chapter, shall be recognized as a valid 
domestic partnership in this state and shall be treated the same as a 
79. DEL.CODE ANN., tit. 13, § 201(1) (West, Westlaw through 80 Laws 2015, ch. 3). 
80. Id. § 202.
81. Rev. Rul. 2013-17, 2013-38 I.R.B. 201.
82. WASH. REV. CODE ANN., 26.60 (West, Westlaw through ch. 4 of the 2015 Reg. Sess.). 
83. Id.
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domestic partnership registered in this state regardless of whether it 
bears the name domestic partnership.84 
Referendum 74 limits domestic partnerships in Washington to 
couples in which at least one of the persons is 62 years of age or older. 
This new provision became effective June 30, 2014. Any state 
registered, same sex domestic partnership where neither party is 62 years 
of age or older is automatically converted into a marriage as of June 30, 
2014, unless dissolved or converted to marriage prior to that date.85 
This means that there is an argument that a non-Washington civil 
union could be recognized in Washington and converted into a 
Washington marriage. 
Washington defines a domestic partnership as one registered in 
Washington, or one that is “substantially equivalent.”86 
2. New Jersey–Washington Shelter
New Jersey defines a civil union to be one established pursuant to 
New Jersey law87 and requires that the parties to a New Jersey civil 
84. Id. § 26.60.090.
85. Id. § 26.60.100(3)(a).
86. Washington’s requirements to enter into a domestic partnership may not be the same as
what constitutes a substantially equivalent domestic partnership. 
Requirements. (Effective June 30, 2014.) 
To enter into a state registered domestic partnership the two persons involved must meet the 
following requirements: 
(1) Both persons share a common residence; 
(2) Both persons are at least eighteen years of age and at least one of the persons is sixty-two years 
of age or older; 
(3) Neither person is married to someone other than the party to the domestic partnership and 
neither person is in a state registered domestic partnership with another person; 
(4) Both persons are capable of consenting to the domestic partnership; and 
(5) Both of the following are true: 
(a) The persons are not nearer of kin to each other than second cousins, whether of the whole or half 
blood computing by the rules of the civil law; and 
(b) Neither person is a sibling, child, grandchild, aunt, uncle, niece, or nephew to the other person. 
Id. § 26.60.030. 
87. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-29 (West, Westlaw through L.2015, c. 24):
Definitions relative to civil unions. 
2.As used in this act: 
“Civil union couple” means two persons who have established a civil union pursuant to this act. 
“Civil union license or civil union certificate” means a document that certifies that the persons 
named on the license or certificate have established a civil union in this State in compliance with 
this act. 
“Civil union” means the legally recognized union of two eligible individuals of the same sex 
established pursuant to this act. Parties to a civil union shall receive the same benefits and 
protections and be subject to the same responsibilities as spouses in a marriage. 
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union not be a party to another civil union, domestic partnership, or 
marriage in New Jersey; not be of the same sex; and be at least 18 years 
of age.88 
This means that parties to out-of-state unions could establish chains 
of civil unions using New Jersey’s definition, since the out-of-state 
unions would not pose a barrier to forming new civil unions in New 
Jersey. 
Example 6. A and B formed a valid civil union in a state other than 
New Jersey. C and D did also. B and C travel to New Jersey, and since 
they are over 18, of the same gender, and are not a party to another 
New Jersey civil union, B and C are eligible to enter into a New Jersey 
union. 
However, as previously mentioned, federal law does not treat New 
Jersey civil unions as marriages for tax purposes. 
A, B, C, and D now travel to Washington. If their unions are 
“substantially equivalent” to a domestic partnership in Washington, 
RCW 26.60.100 now automatically converts their relationships (A+B, 
C+D, and the New Jersey B+C) into Washington marriages. 
C. State-Centric Definitions 
A number of states have same sex union laws that purportedly 
apply only to unions formed in that state.89 These laws may have 
reciprocity provisions or allow other states’ residents to enjoy the same 
benefits if they meet eligibility requirements. While this creates the 
potential for disregarded unions, it also opens the possibility of 
“creating” void unions to be used in another state, which would then 
recognize the void union.90 
Other types of statutes apply to out of state unions that are 
“substantially” the same as that state’s unions. None of these statutes 
88. Id. § 37:1-30:
3.For two persons to establish a civil union in this State, it shall be necessary that they satisfy all of
the following criteria: 
a. Not be a party to another civil union, domestic partnership or marriage in this State;
b. Be of the same sex; and
c. Be at least 18 years of age, except as provided in section 10 of this act.
89. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-3.1-1 (West, Westlaw through ch. 555 of the Jan.
2014 sess.). 
90. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 4 (West, Westlaw through the 2013-2014 Vt. Gen.
Assembly (2014)) (“Civil marriages contracted while either party has a living spouse or a living 
party to a civil union is legally married or joined in civil union to a living person other than the 
party to that marriage shall be void.”). 
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define “substantially,” which leaves the likelihood of litigation later.91 
Further, not all states recognize or provide for “same sex divorce.” 
What may be a dissolved marriage in one state may still be a valid 
marriage in another, and this could be used to enter into multiparty 
marriages. 
D. Tax Consequences 
Having established that such multiparty unions are possible under 
current law, several questions could be raised about the continued 
viability of such planning. First, what if a state tried to restrict the 
availability of such unions? Second, what would happen if a state tried 
to take away the status of a union already formed, but formed by those 
that the state considered not the “true” objects of the law? Third, could a 
state change the law mid-stream to restrict some of the consequences 
discussed below? 
1. Contributions
Let’s assume the ABCD union is ready to do business and 
organizes itself with the following assets: 
Asset Basis Value 
A Cash 100 100 
B Equip 10 100 
C Land 70 100 
D IP 5 100 
If ABCD were organized as a partnership and received an offer to 
sell its land to an interested buyer for $120, there would be $50 of gain. 
Assuming that the land had been held for longer than one year, that gain 
would be long term capital gain,92 and the first $30 of gain would be 
allocated to C;93 the remaining $20 would be divided four ways, with A, 
91. Both Washington and Connecticut have this type of statute. For example:
A person is eligible to marry if such person is:  
(1) Not a party to another marriage, or a relationship that provides substantially the same rights, 
benefits and responsibilities as a marriage, entered into in this state or another state or jurisdiction, 
unless the parties to the marriage will be the same as the parties to such other marriage or 
relationship. 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-20a(1) (West, Westlaw through Jan. 1, 2015). 
92. 26 U.S.C. § 1222(3) (2012) (assuming that the partnership was not a dealer in land.)
93. 26 U.S.C. § 704(c) (2012).
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B, C, and D each getting $5.94 
What would happen if ABCD were a marital union? First, there is 
no entity to transfer assets to. State law may presume there to be a 
marital community, either in the form of a common law pooling of 
assets95 or an actual community property scheme. However, there is not 
presumed to be a transfer of assets to that community, but rather a 
transmutation of assets from separately owned to community owned,96 
and in any event, the tax law does not care. Code section 1041 states, 
“No gain or loss shall be recognized on a transfer of property from an 
individual to (or in trust for the benefit of) a spouse . . . .” 
This generally means that spouses may freely transfer assets among 
themselves without any tax consequences (including being able to shift 
the basis to a spouse).97 There is a notable exception where the spouse is 
a nonresident alien. 
Assuming all parties are U.S. residents, how is the gain shared in a 
marital union? Post-Windsor, there exists an interesting anomaly. 
Advocates for the repeal of DOMA have argued that the federal 
government should follow state law in deciding whether a couple is 
“married.” Since a host of federal benefits, including tax benefits, follow 
that status of “married,” following state law would allow those states 
who wish to experiment with the definition of marriage to allow those 
citizens to also reap the benefits. 
But we have a difficult situation, since we have two couples, A+B 
and C+D, who are married in State 1 but have also arranged matters so 
that A+D and B+C are treated as married in State 2. So which state law 
controls? 
One option is to allow both laws to grant marital benefits; 
essentially, treat all parties as “married.” Our tax system is not set up for 
multiple spouses, so this would cause some waves. We could, however, 
hypothesize that what should happen is to allow all the parties to split 
their incomes equally.98 This would mean that upon the sale of the land 
for $120, the $50 gain would be split at $12.50 each. 
This raises another problem: how do four persons file a joint 
return? 
94. Id.
95. Kornhauser, supra note 44, at 1431-33; but cf. Bridges v. Bridges, 125 Cal. App. 2d 359,
362 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.1954). 
96. See Joan M. Krauskopf, The Transmutation and Source of Funds Rules in Division of
Marital Property, 50 MO. L. REV. 759, 761-62 (1985). 
97. 26 U.S.C. §1041(b) (2012).
98. See Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 118 (1930).
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2. Characterization
Returning to the previous example, when the ABCD union agrees 
to sell the land for $120, do they report the gain as capital (subject to a 
maximum tax rate of 20%)99 or as ordinary? Does it matter which 
member of the union sold the land? If C, who contributed the land, is a 
real estate developer, the land should be inventory in his hands, and the 
resulting gain would be ordinary. But what if D negotiates for and 
consummates the sale? 
Land stays put. What if the assets that are sold are movable and are 
sold by another member of the union, and in another state from the state 
in which C is domiciled? 
3. Swaps and Distributions
Returning to the first two examples at the beginning of the article 
may serve to illustrate the difficult issues our system faces.100 F owns a 
building worth $2 million, which has a $1 million basis. If G buys F’s 
building for $2 million in cash, F recognizes $1 million of gain. 
However, if F and G are part of a marital union, 26 U.S.C. §1041 
provides for the non-recognition of the $1 million gain. It is simply 
gone. 
If it is possible to enter into multiple marriages, and if federal law 
recognizes those marriages, then the temptation exists for parties to 
marry a buyer of their property in order to avoid the tax. That temptation 
is a serious threat to the continued viability of the U.S. tax system. 
E. Bigamy Laws 
The Model Penal Code defines bigamy as a misdemeanor and 
polygamy as a felony.101 While the two are related, they are not the same 
crime. Bigamy ensues when the actor “contracts or purports to contract 
another marriage,” while polygamy requires the actor to marry or 
cohabit “with more than one spouse at a time in purported exercise of 
the right of plural marriage.”102 
According to Joel Feinberg in Moral Limits of the Criminal Law: 
“Righteously, flaunting one’s illicit relationships, according to the Code, 
is apparently a morally aggravating circumstance, more punishable than 
99. 26 U.S.C. §1(h) (2012).
100.  See supra Part I. 
101.  MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.1 (2013). 
102.  Id. 
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its clandestine and deceptive counterpart.”103 
Before Christianity became the official religion of the Roman Empire, 
Diocletian and Maximilian passed strict anti-polygamy laws in 285 CE 
that mandated monogamy as the only form of legal marital 
relationship, as had traditionally been the case in classical Greece and 
Rome. In 393, the Byzantine Emperor Theodosius I issued an imperial 
edict to extend the ban on polygamy to Jewish communities. In 1000, 
Rabbi Gershom ben Judah ruled polygamy inadmissible within Jewish 
communities. 
According to feminist historian Sarah McDougall, the Christian 
European insistence on monogamy and its enforcement arose as a 
consequence of 16th Century Islamic incursions into Central Europe 
and the advent of European colonialism within the Americas, Africa 
and Asia, which exposed European Christians to cultures that practised 
polygamy. As a consequence, nominal Christian male bigamists were 
subjected to unprecedented harsh punishments, such as execution, 
galley servitude, exile, and prolonged imprisonment. McDougall 
argues that female bigamists were not as harshly punished due to 
women’s perceived inferiority and absence of moral agency.104 
J, K, L and M, desiring to form a business, enter into marriages as 
explained above. None have been married before, and all are male. They 
then move to Texas to conduct business operations. Will they be 
criminally liable for engaging in bigamy? 
Note that bigamy is a separate crime and does not necessarily 
impact the validity of a person’s second marriage, in that state or 
another. That validity is determined pursuant to the marriage statute. 
1. Texas
Texas makes it a crime for one legally married to “[purport] to 
marry or does marry a person other than his spouse in this state, or any 
other state or foreign country, under circumstances that would, but for 
the actor’s prior marriage, constitute a marriage.”105 Since this is a Texas 
103.  JOEL FEINBERG, 3 MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 402 (1989). 
 104.  Bigomy, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bigamy (last visited March 31, 2015). 
See also The Week Staff, Brazil’s Groundbreaking Three-Person Civil Union, THE WEEK (Apr. 30, 
2012), http://theweek.com/article/index/232665/brazils-groundbreaking-three-person-civil-union; 
Joanna L. Grossman, Beware the Undissolved Civil Union: Massachusetts’ Highest Court Says That 
A Subsequent Marriage is Polygamy, VERDICT (Aug. 21, 2012), http://verdict.justia.com/
2012/08/21/beware-the-undissolved-civil-union; Paul Belien, First Trio “Married” in the 
Netherlands, BRUSSELS J. (Sept. 26, 2005, 11:08 PM), http://www.brusselsjournal.com/node/301. 
105.  TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.01 (West, Westlaw through the end f the 2013 3rd called 
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criminal statute, it must be read to mean a marriage within the state of 
Texas. Thus, if the second marriage would not constitute a marriage 
within Texas, then the act of entering into the second marriage would 
not be a crime in Texas. 
2. Utah
76-7-101. Bigamy – Defense. 
1. A person is guilty of bigamy when, knowing he has a husband or
wife or knowing the other person has a husband or wife, the 
person purports to marry another person or cohabits with another 
person. 
2. Bigamy is a felony of the third degree.
3. It shall be a defense to bigamy that the accused reasonably believed
he and the other person were legally eligible to remarry.106 
Utah prohibits cohabitation and marriage, but does it prohibit a civil 
union while married? “‘Cohabiting’ means residing with another person 
and being involved in a sexual relationship with that person.”107 So if the 
second relationship were non-sexual, there would be no cohabitation. If 
the second relationship is also not a marriage,108 then there should be no 
sess. of the 83rd legis.): 
(a) An individual commits an offense if: 
(1) he is legally married and he: 
(A) purports to marry or does marry a person other than his spouse in this state, or any other state or 
foreign country, under circumstances that would, but for the actor’s prior marriage, constitute a 
marriage; or 
(B) lives with a person other than his spouse in this state under the appearance of being married; or 
(2) he knows that a married person other than his spouse is married and he: 
(A) purports to marry or does marry that person in this state, or any other state or foreign country, 
under circumstances that would, but for the person’s prior marriage, constitute a marriage; or 
(B) lives with that person in this state under the appearance of being married. 
(b) For purposes of this section, “under the appearance of being married” means holding out that the 
parties are married with cohabitation and an intent to be married by either party. 
(c) It is a defense to prosecution under Subsection (a)(1) that the actor reasonably believed at the 
time of the commission of the offense that the actor and the person whom the actor married or 
purported to marry or with whom the actor lived under the appearance of being married were legally 
eligible to be married because the actor’s prior marriage was void or had been dissolved by death, 
divorce, or annulment. For purposes of this subsection, an actor’s belief is reasonable if the belief is 
substantiated by a certified copy of a death certificate or other signed document issued by a court. 
106.  UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-101 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Gen. Sess.) 
107.  Id. § 78B-6-103(11). 
108.  However, Utah also has prohibited such unions pursuant to its Constitution. 
(1) Marriage consists only of the legal union between a man and a woman. 
(2) No other domestic union, however denominated, may be recognized as a marriage or given the 
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crime of bigamy. And if it were, Utah provides a defense based on the 
reasonable belief that the second (or more) marriage was legal. 
3. New York
People erroneously believe that bigamy – being married to more than 
one person – is illegal in New York. The truth is more complicated. 
Penal Law 255.15 provides that “A person is guilty of bigamy when he 
contracts or purports to contract a marriage with another person at a 
time when he has a living spouse, or the other person has a living 
spouse.” 
Thus, the act of marrying is prohibited, but the state of being married 
to two people is not (legally the second marriage is a nullity). I 
represented someone charged with bigamy years ago. The charges 
were dismissed because the act of marriage was more than five years 
prior to the commencement of the prosecution, and thus the 
prosecution was barred by the statute of limitations (the case was 
merely re-marriage without divorce, not a man living with two 
wives).109 
F. State Concerns 
1. Would States Allow This?
“Every year in the United States, there are approximately 2.5 
million weddings, and the wedding industry has grown to an empire of 
40 billion dollars per year.”110 This number is estimated to be $55 billion 
by another study.111 For 2013, there were 87,159 weddings in Las Vegas 
that generated $2.4 billion of revenue.112 
The marriage “industry” is closely tied to tourism and is a major 
same or substantially equivalent legal effect. 
UT. CONST. art. 1, § 29 (ruled unconstitutional by Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 
2014)). 
 109.  Griswel, Bigamy Itself is Not Illegal in New York, Comment to Harems Accepted in the 
West, DANIEL PIPES MIDDLE EAST F. (Jun. 1, 2007, 9:44 AM), 
http://www.danielpipes.org/comments/95633. 
 110.  Wedding Industry in the United States, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Wedding_industry_in_the_United_States#cite_note-1 (last updated Jan. 7, 2015). 
 111.  United States Complete Wedding Report, WEDDING REPORT, 
http://www.theweddingreport.com/wmdb/index.cfm?action=db.viewdetail&t=s&lc=00&setloc=y 
(last visited Apr. 7, 2015).  
 112.  Las Vegas-Paradise, NV – (Metropolitan Area) Complete Market Report, WEDDING 
REPORT, 
http://www.theweddingreport.com/wmdb/index.cfm?action=db.viewdetail&t=m&lc=29820&setloc
=y (last visited Apr. 1, 2015).  
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financial boon for many states. 
But these “shelter” marriages are not the type that most wedding 
planners think about (the Las Vegas weddings mentioned above average 
130 guests). These are the type of arrangements that happen with as 
much fanfare as filing incorporation documents. 
Delaware might provide a better example of what benefits may 
accrue to a state or states that actively promote such arrangements: 
• Over 50% of U.S. publicly traded corporations and 60% of
the Fortune 500 companies are incorporated in Delaware; 
• In fiscal year 2005, revenues collected by the Division
reached a record $626.1 million; 
• LLC tax revenues $63.4 million;
• UCC general fund revenues $13.8 million;
• Revenue from incorporations accounted for 22 percent of
Delaware’s general fund;
• Income from customers’ requests for expedited service (24-
hour, same day, two-hour or one-hour) was $17.5 million
(which more than covered the Division’s operating
expenses of $9.2 million).113
The point is simply that a state could find a large financial benefit 
from encouraging (i.e., legalizing) multiple marriages for tax purposes. 
3. Interstate Concerns
What will happen when these marriages cross state lines?114 
 113.  Delaware Means Business: Ever Wonder Why Most U.S. Businesses are Established in 
Delaware?, SIXWISE.COM, http://www.sixwise.com/newsletters/06/05/17/delaware-means-
business-ever-wonder-why-most-us-businesses-are-established-in-delaware.htm (last visited Mar. 
31, 2015); Alex Mayyasi, Is Delaware a Tax Haven?, PRICEONOMICS (Aug. 13, 2013), 
http://priceonomics.com/is-delaware-a-tax-haven/; Leslie Wayne, How Delaware Thrives as a 
Corporate Tax Haven, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 30, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/01/
business/how-delaware-thrives-as-a-corporate-tax-haven.html?_r=0. 
 114.  Catherine Martin Christopher, Will Filing Status Be Portable? Tax Implications of 
Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage. 4 PITT. TAX. REV. 137, 150 (2007).  
The cost of being wedlocked might not be self-evident. After all, what is the harm in 
being trapped in a void marriage? As it turns out, the harms can be significant. A same-
sex couple validly married in one jurisdiction remains in that valid marriage despite the 
fact that the couple, or a member of the couple, resides in a jurisdiction that does not 
recognize their marriage. The couple’s legal union will be recognized by the growing 
number of jurisdictions that recognize same-sex unions. As a result, if a member of the 
couple moves to, or even travels through a recognizing state, the individual will be 
considered married in that state. Likewise, if the non-recognizing state where the couple 
resides changes its policy and becomes a recognizing state, suddenly the couple—
previously unable to get a divorce because the marriage was void—will be married. 
Married couples seek divorce for a myriad of reasons. Those reasons include the 
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Windsor, which held DOMA unconstitutional, contains an important 
discussion on the states’ authority to define marriage.115 When the 
constitution was adopted, states “possessed full power over the subject 
of marriage and divorce . . . [and] the Constitution delegated no 
authority to the Government of the United States on the subject of 
marriage and divorce.”116 Because of this authority, “the Federal 
Government, through our history, has deferred to state-law policy 
decisions with respect to domestic relations.”117 As a general rule the 
federal courts do not adjudicate “issues of marital status,” even if there is 
a basis for federal jurisdiction.118 In its decision, the Court noted it was 
unnecessary to decide whether the federal definition of marriage in 
DOMA that intruded on the state power was a violation of the 
Constitution.119 
From the Windsor dicta, it is clear that the federal government 
wanted to point out its ability to impose restrictions on how states 
choose to define marriage. The Court pointed out that Congress has the 
authority to “make determinations that bear on marital rights and 
pragmatic—such as distribution of property, assignment of spousal support, and division 
of debt, and the emotional—such as finality and repose. Married couples also seek 
divorce knowing that without a divorce decree neither partner can remarry. This last 
reason is likely the most important because, although couples can sometimes handle the 
pragmatic and emotional issues surrounding the end of marriage on their own, there is no 
way couples can legally divorce—thereby allowing the individuals to remarry—absent 
judicial intervention. As the Supreme Court counsels, “we know of no instance where 
two consenting adults may divorce and mutually liberate themselves from the constraints 
of legal obligations that go with marriage . . . without invoking the State’s judicial 
machinery.” It is for these reasons that married same-sex couples, regardless of the state 
in which they live, need access to divorce. 
Indeed, married same-sex couples in states that do not recognize same-sex unions 
understand the importance of divorce and have sought it out. Too many courts, however, 
have refused to allow access to divorce, basing that refusal on two related but distinct 
rationales. Some courts have asserted that they do not have subject-matter jurisdiction 
over same-sex divorce, while other courts have maintained that same-sex divorce is not a 
claim for which relief can be granted. Both of these conclusions, however, are wrong. 
Assertions regarding lack of subject-matter jurisdiction over same-sex divorce have been 
justified by misguided readings of state DoMAs and misunderstandings of state court 
jurisdiction. Similarly, the conclusion that courts cannot provide relief to same-sex 
couples seeking divorce is based on misinterpretations of the requirements of state 
DoMAs. Moreover, refusing to allow same-sex couples to divorce violates long-standing 
principles of equity and violates rights guaranteed by the federal Constitution. 
Mary Patricia Byrn & Morgan L. Holcomb, Wedlocked, 67 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 3-6 (2012). 
115.  See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2689-93 (U.S. 2013). 
116.  Id. at 2691 (quoting Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562, 575 (1906)). 
117.  Id. at 2691. 
118.  Id.  
119.  Id. at 2692. 
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privileges.”120 The Court also made it clear that limited federal laws that 
regulate the meaning of marriage in order to “further federal policy” are 
constitutional.121 
Prior to the decision, states chose how to define marriage and 
consequently assessed state taxes accordingly. On the other hand, the 
federal government collected taxes accordingly to its interpretation of 
marriage, which was between one man and one woman.122 After 
Windsor, the federal government has decided for federal tax purposes 
that it will rely on the individual state’s definition of marriage when 
collecting taxes, with a few limitations.123 
V. CONCLUSION 
In the 1940s, couples were trying to avoid the high tax rates by 
forming partnerships. The federal courts, interpreting federal tax law, 
determined that such partnerships were, in large measure, not valid 
partnerships, but were mere attempts to cloak a marital sharing of 
income and expenses as a business entity. Today, we can foresee the 
opposite to be possible—using the new “marriage,” civil union, and 
domestic partnership laws of the 50 states to fashion a business entity 
that gets taxed as a marriage. 
This is not good news for the federal government, which already 
faces criticism of a tax code that is large and unwieldy to all except 
specialized practitioners. This is especially true when the creation of 
such relationships gives a state a financial benefit and when the 
“solution” to the resulting wreck of the federal tax system involves the 
federal government, again, to closely examine what it means to be a 
family for tax purposes—an argument that all three branches of the 
federal government have been more than happy to leave to the states. 
What will happen if and when these types of relationships begin to 
surface? The federal tax code is not geared to deal with multiparty 
marriages or marriages that are entered into for tax purposes.124 It seems 
that the federal government will have one of two options to prevent 
widespread gaming of the tax system: (1) prosecute those marriages that 
are not “real” or (2) remove the concept of marital benefits from the tax 
code. Either solution is fraught with peril. 
120.  Id. at 2690. 
121.  Id.  
122.  1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012). 
123.  See Rev. Rul. 2013-17, 2013-38 I.R.B. 201. 
124.  At least, not in large part. While it can be argued that many couples consider the financial 
benefits of marriage to be part of the “package,” we have not had to deal with tax-driven marriages. 
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In an era where states’ rights are given higher consideration than 
federal tax concerns, it may be possible to use the disparity between 
state laws to craft a marriage tax shelter. However, the resulting damage 
to the federal tax system will leave all Americans, married or not, 
singing: 
What’s love got to do, got to do with it 
Who needs a [tax] 
When a [tax] can be broken?125 
VI.  EPILOGUE
On June 26, 2015, as the final edits were being made to this article, 
the U.S. Supreme Court issued a ruling in Obergefell v. Hodges126, 
which held that the Fourteenth Amendment requires a state to license a 
marriage between two people of the same sex and to recognize a 
marriage between two people of the same sex performed in another state. 
While that would seem to be the end of the matter, I would like 
point out that the laws of the various states on the matter of same sex 
marriages are still not uniform, even after Obergefell.  Requiring a state 
to license a marriage and having a state statute that actually does so are 
not the same thing.  Even among the states before Obergefell, the law of 
marriage was not uniform. 
I would also like to point out that immediately after the decision 
was handed down, several states suspended issuing licenses, announced 
that their clerks and judges could decide not to issue licenses, or 
considered doing away with all licenses completely.  The resolution of 
these actions may take some time to see. 
In the meantime, the question remains: is it possible to use what 
promises to be a ripe field of differing marriage laws to gain a tax 
advantage for business or personal tax purposes?  If so, what options 
will the federal government have if such a "loophole" proves to be a 
serious drain on federal revenues? 
The Obergefell majority observed that "these cases involve only the 
rights of two consenting adults whose marriages would pose no risk of 
harm to themselves or third parties."  I only wish I could agree. 
July 2015 
125.  TINA TURNER, What’s Love Got To Do With It, on PRIVATE DANCER (Capitol Records 
1984). 
126.  The best reference for the case is:  Obergefell v. Hodges, 2015 WL 2473451 (2015). 
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